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ARGUMENT 
I. The Only Possible Appeal from the Decision Below is a 
URAP Rule 5 Appeal. 
In its response brief, Westgate argues that CPG had an appeal 
as of right (a URAP Rule 3 appeal) because the trial court's Ruling 
and Order resulted in CPG's motion to confirm the Arbitration Award 
being denied. Acknowledging that the Order "also vacated the same 
arbitration award and directed a rehearing" Westgate asserts that 
"those additional mandates in the order do not change the analysis." 
Response Brief at 13. Westgate complains that CPG's arguments 
ignore "that the district court's order denies confirmation of an award 
and focus only upon the fact that the order also vacates the award 
and directs a rehearing." Id. at 18. CPG unsurprisingly disagrees 
and asserts that the analysis is changed based upon the decision 
made by the trial court. It is the vacatur of the award which is the key 
to the district court's decision and the basis for this appeal. 
The question of whether the district court's Order triggered the 
rights of appeal listed in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 should be 
decided by looking at the language of the Order and of the Ruling 
upon which the Order is based. The Order is titled as an order on 
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both CPG's combined motion for confirmation, for attorney fees and 
for certification under URCP Rule 54(b) and Westgate's motion to 
vacate, and reads: 
Pursuant to this Court's Ruling dated September 30, 2010, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by 
reference, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Westgate Resorts, Ltd.'s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award 
is GRANTED; 
2. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Arbitration 
Award dated February 2, 2010 issued in the arbitration 
proceedings styled: Consumer Protection Group, LLC v. 
Westgate Resorts, Ltd., is VACATED, RENDERED NULL 
AND VOID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT; and 
3. Consumer Protection Group, LLC's Combined Motion to 
Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and 
Expenses and for Rule 54(b) Certificate of Judgment as 
Final is DENIED. 
By its very language the Order makes clear that granting the 
Motion to Vacate, and the vacating of the Arbitration Award, were the 
principal and primary purposes of the Order. Having vacated the 
award, the trial court had no other option than to deny the now moot 
motion to confirm the award. There was no award to confirm after the 
award was vacated. The trial court was extremely clear: the 
Arbitration Award was "VACATED, RENDERED NULL AND VOID 
and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT." (All capitals in the original). 
2 
Two of the three sub-points of the Order addressed the vacating of 
the Arbitration Award. The trial court wanted no confusion: the 
Arbitration Award was vacated, and as a result, the other motion was, 
obviously, denied, because it was moot. 
The Ruling upon which the Order is based, which the trial court 
incorporated into the Order by reference, also makes clear that the 
trial court granted Westgate's motion to vacate and, as a result, had 
to deny CPG's motion to confirm. Following the recitation of the 
parties' several arguments, the pages of the Ruling devoted to the 
trial court's analysis and conclusion address only one topic: 
Westgate's motion to vacate. See Ruling at 6-8. The only analysis 
the trial court engaged in concerns the motion to vacate. At the end 
of the analysis discussing the arbitrator's duty to disclose, the trial 
court concludes with "Westgate's Motion to vacate Arbitration Award 
is granted." Id. at 8. Only after that conclusion does the trial court 
even mention CPG's motion, and only to observe that CPG's 
Combined Motion "is denied." Id. Having granted Westgate's Motion 
to Vacate, the trial court had no need to, and did not, analyze CPG's 
Motion, because that motion was moot. 
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The language of the Ruling is clear. The trial court analyzed 
and granted the motion to vacate, and the denial of CPG's motions is 
a by-product, the result of the trial court's analysis on Westgate's 
Motion to Vacate. If Westgate's argument were correct, that this is an 
appeal from a denial of the motion to confirm, this Court should be 
able to review the trial court's analysis on the motion to confirm. This 
Court cannot do that because there is no analysis in the Ruling or the 
Order addressing the motion to confirm. Westgate is wrong in 
labeling this an appeal from the denial of the motion to confirm. This 
is an appeal from the only issue addressed by the trial court: the 
motion to vacate. That is the only issue which this Court can review. 
See e.g. Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 839 
P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992) (applying the presumption that trial court 
decisions are correct "has little operative effect when members of this 
Court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because of the cryptic 
nature of its ruling"). 
Because the trial court's ruling and order focused solely on the 
motion to vacate and did not discuss the motion to confirm, the 
decision below did not trigger Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-129 (1)(c) 
which provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken from an order 
A 
confirming or denying confirmation of an award." Because the trial 
court's decision vacating the award included a rehearing, the decision 
below also did not trigger Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 (1)(e) which 
limits appeals to one "taken from an order vacating an award without 
directing a rehearing." Therefore, no URAP Rule 3 appeal flowed 
from the decision of the court below, and a URAP Rule 5 appeal is 
the only logical and possible way to present the issue to this Court. 
In Powell v. Cannon, this Court explained that there are 
exceptions to the final judgment rule, and that those exceptions are 
statutory appellate rights, URAP Rule 5 appeal from interlocutory 
orders, and certification of an order under URCP Rule 54(b). Powell 
v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, f l 3 ; 179 P.3d 799. There is no URCP Rule 
54(b) certification before the Court. As discussed above, none of the 
statutory bases contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 were 
triggered by the trial court decision. Therefore, only URAP Rule 5 
can provide this Court the jurisdiction to decide the important issue 
presented on appeal, whether the motion to vacate was properly 
granted by the trial court. 
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The Hicks Decision is Inapposite 
Westgate's argument for defeating jurisdiction rests in part on 
Hicks v. UBS Financial Services, 2010 UT App. 26, fflj 15-17; 226 
P.3d 762. In Hicks, the Court of Appeals found it had jurisdiction over 
an appeal brought under URAP Rule 3, concluding it was bound by 
its prior decision in Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 v. UTA, 
2004 UT App 310, ffl| 11-13; 99 P.3d 379. Amalgamated had found 
jurisdiction to review an order granting a motion to compel arbitration. 
The Hicks case is similar to this case only because the Hicks 
trial court decision also involved a motion to vacate and a motion to 
confirm an arbitration award, with that trial court vacating the award. 
The Hicks case, however, is unlike this case because of the posture 
of the case at the Court of Appeals; the Hicks appeal was brought 
under URAP Rule 3. Although, in Hicks, the Court of Appeals 
discussed issues raised by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129, it 
ultimately decided it was bound to its earlier Amalgamated decision 
which had relied on the Utah Constitution's mandate that "there shall 
be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction 
to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause." Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Local 382 v. UTA, 1J8 (quoting Utah Constitution Article 
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VIII, §5). The Hicks decision held that the order from that trial court 
was as final an order as the order in Amalgamated. Hicks v. UBS 
Financial Sen/ices, fl17. 
Unlike in Hicks, in this case the Court is not faced with a URAP 
Rule 3 appeal from a final order. As this Court has explained, "For an 
order or judgment to be final, it must dispose of the case as to all the 
parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on 
the merits of the case. In other words, it must end the controversy 
between the litigants." Powell v. Cannon, ^|13. Here, the subject-
matter of the litigation between the parties goes on, the dispute has 
not been finally concluded, and the controversy remains. 
When the trial court granted Westgate's motion to arbitrate, the 
trial court severed the UPUAA claims from the common law and the 
breach of contract claims. Those claims were retained by the trial 
court. (R. 4718.) Although the UPUAA claims were arbitrated, the 
other claims have not been resolved. After the arbitration panel 
issued its Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Award, the 
parties returned to the trial court which had ordered the arbitration. 
CPG moved for confirmation of the award, attorney fees and 
certification as final under URCP Rule 54(b). (R. 5797.) Westgate 
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opposed CPG's motion and moved to vacate the award. (R. 5909.) 
When the trial court granted Westgate's motion to vacate, both 
parties and the trial court understood that an arbitration rehearing 
was ordered. It is not to be doubted that if this Court were to hold it 
lacks jurisdiction to hear this URAP Rule 5 appeal and the arbitration 
rehearing is held, the parties will return to the trial court seeking 
confirmation or vacatur of the rehearing results. Thus the trial court's 
decision vacating the award is not a final order as defined by this 
Court. It does not end the controversy between CPG and Westgate. 
The Utah Uniform Arbitration Act Did Not Vitiate URAP Rule 5 
The decision appealed here combines granting a motion to 
vacate with a rehearing and a denial of a motion to confirm. The 
Utah Uniform Arbitration Act does not address the appealability of an 
order which combines various decisions. Made on its own merits, the 
decision to deny confirmation might be appealable under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(c). But the decision to deny confirmation was 
not taken on its own merit. It came about only because of the 
decision which the trial court made, to vacate the award. A decision 
to vacate an award may, under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(e), 
grant appellate rights if the award is vacated without a rehearing. 
But, as noted by the Court of Appeals, "subsection (e) of section 129 
appears to deny us jurisdiction because the district court vacated the 
award and directed a rehearing, the opposite of an allowed appeal." 
Hicks v. UBS, 1J12. Because, in this case, both parties and the trial 
court understood the decision to vacate to include a rehearing, there 
is no right of appeal under subsection (e). 
Yet, it is precisely the decision to vacate which CPG is seeking 
to appeal pursuant to URAP Rule 5. It is the decision to vacate which 
is the crux of the issue. Indeed, the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 
makes this clear in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-123 when it provides 
that when a party moves for confirmation of an award, "the court 
shall issue a confirming order unless the award is modified or 
corrected pursuant to Section 78B-11-121 or 78B-11-125 or is 
vacated pursuant to Section 78B-11-124." In other words, the act of 
confirming the award is secondary to a modification, a correction or 
an order to vacate the award. Although this is common sense, an 
award cannot be confirmed if it has been vacated, thus Section 129 
becomes confusing when read in light of URAP Rule 5's discretionary 
appeals from interlocutory orders. 
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URAP Rule 5 permits appeals from interlocutory orders when 
an analysis by this Court of a statute or rule may be determinative of 
an issue. In this matter, if the Court decides the first cousin issue by 
confirming CPG's position, there will be no need for a rehearing of the 
arbitration and the Court will have materially advanced the 
termination of the litigation. Westgate has argued that the Court 
lacks jurisdiction under URAP Rule 5 because only an appeal as of 
right is justified by the decision of the trial court and CPG did not 
bring a URAP Rule 3 appeal. But a URAP Rule 3 appeal could not 
be brought from the order to vacate because that order included a 
rehearing, and such an appeal is precluded by Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-11-129(e). Under Westgate's analysis, CPG should have 
appealed from the denial of the mooted motion to confirm. But if a 
motion is moot, it cannot form the basis for an appeal under URAP 
Rule 3. This Court will not address moot claims on appeal. Baker v. 
Stevens, 2005 UT 32, H 9; 114 P.3d 580 (citing Black v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 2004 UT 66,1f 29; 100 P.3d 1163). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 creates a statutory right of 
appeal in certain circumstances, but it does not take away other 
bases for appeal such as URAP Rule 5 appeals from interlocutory 
m 
orders and URCP Rule 54(c) certification. Any argument which 
seeks to limit the applicability of URAP Rule 5 by barring motions to 
vacate from being appealed under URAP Rule 5 if the motion to 
vacate resulted in a denial of a motion to confirm should be rejected. 
This Court should make clear that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 
does not destroy interlocutory appeals under URAP Rule 5. 
The Majority of States Have Correctly Rejected Appeals in this 
Situation 
Westgate urges this Court to adopt the minority position from 
other states by finding an appeal as of right from trial court decisions 
combining motions to vacate and motions to confirm. The majority of 
courts from other states which have addressed the jurisdictional issue 
presented by a trial court decision simultaneously vacating an award 
and denying a motion to confirm have correctly concluded that such 
orders are not appealable. Courts in California1, Hawaii2, Kentucky3, 
Missouri4, Nebraska5, Nevada6, North Carolina7, South Dakota8, and 
1
 Long Beach Iron Works, Inc. v. Int'l Molders & Allied Workers Union 
of North America, 103 Cal. Rptr. 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). 
2
 Hawaii Org. Police Officers v. County of Kauai, 230 P. 3d 428 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 2010). 
3
 Paul Miller Ford v. Craycraft, 2005 WL 1593418 (Ky. Ct. App. July 
8, 2005). 
4
 Department of Transportation. State Employee Association, 581 A. 
2d 813 (Me. 1990). 
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the District of Columbia9 have dismissed appeals for lack of 
jurisdiction. Some of those courts have held that allowing such 
orders to be appealed would be contrary to the public policy of 
encouraging arbitration by allowing appeals as of right before "a 
sufficient degree of finality to the arbitration proceeding." Karcher 
Firestopping v. Meadow Valley Contractors, 204 P.3d 1262, 1264 
(Nev. 2009). Others have held that "allowing such orders to be 
appealed simply because a portion of the order denies confirmation 
of an award renders the 'without directing a rehearing' language of 
these states' version of [Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(e)] 
superfluous." Id. 
A minority of courts, Arizona10, Massachusetts11, Tennessee12, 
and Texas13, have found jurisdiction to be proper. Even though the 
5
 Nebraska Department of Health v. Struss, 623 N.W.2d 308 (Neb. 
2001). 
6
 Karcher Firestopping v. Meadow Valley Contractors, 204 P.3d 1262 
(Nev. 2009). 
7
 In re Arbitration, State of N.C. & Davidson & Jones Construction 
Co., 323 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). 
8
 Double Diamond Construction v. Farmers Coop. Elevator 
Association, 656 N.W.2d 744 (S.D. 2003). 
9
 Connerton, Ray & Simon v. Simon, 791 A.2d 86 (D.C. 2002). 
10
 Wages v. Smith Barney 937 P.2d 715 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). 
11
 Fazio v. Emp'rs' Liability Assur. Corp., 197 N.E.2d 598 (Mass. 
1964). 
12
 Boyle v. Thomas, 1997 WL 710912 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1997). 
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Utah Court of Appeals did not decide the issue directly, some have 
interpreted the Hicks decision as aligning Utah with the minority 
position.14 
Contrary to Westgate's argument, CPG's position reaffirms the 
public policy favoring arbitration by ensuring a degree of finality 
before finding a right of appeal as of right, while preserving the 
important URAP Rule 5 appeals for interlocutory orders if the trial 
court errs in vacating an award. Westgate's argument, that under 
CPG's interpretation a prevailing party could be denied appellate 
review indefinitely (Response Brief at 23), fail s to recognize that 
URAP Rule 5 appeals, the appeal being pursued in this matter, exist 
to protect a party from an erroneous trial court decision. It is CPG's 
position, not Westgate's, which ensures review that a "court-ordered 
'do over' is necessary." Id. It is CPG's position driving this appeal 
that the trial court's "do over" order is not necessary in this case, and 
that this Court should reverse that lower court order. Westgate's 
argument is aimed at the contrary result, preventing this Court from 
reviewing the trial court's "do over" order. 
13
 East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline, 307 S.W. 3d 267 
(Tex. 2010). 
14
 Id. at 273. 
13 
Finding that a trial court order (which vacates an arbitration 
award thus mandating a denial of a concurrent motion to confirm) 
does not create a right of appeal under the Uniform Arbitration Act is 
consistent with the statute's dictate that trial courts must first rule on 
motions to vacate, correct or modify. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-
123. Such an understanding does not cause any conflict within the 
Uniform Arbitration Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(c), which 
grants a right of appeal if a trial court denies a motion to confirm, 
protects the arbitration process from a trial court refusing to confirm 
an award simply because it disagrees with the result of the 
arbitration. Unless there is a motion to vacate, to correct or to modify, 
a trial court "shall issue a confirming order." See Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-11-123. Subsection (c) of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1) 
provides a right of appeal from an order which fails to follow Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-11-123. But there is no basis for an appeal under 
subsection (c) when the trial court grants a motion to vacate an award 
because the trial court has acted as authorized in the Act. 
This Court should find that there is no appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(c) because the trial court vacated the 
award pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-123. As a result of the 
14 
vacatur decision, CPG, the prevailing party in the arbitration, can 
have recourse to URAP Rule 5 to seek review of the basis for the 
order to vacate. Such a finding by this Court protects the public 
interest in arbitration, interprets the Uniform Arbitration Act 
consistently, and protects litigants from errors by trial courts. 
II. Arbitrator Burbidge's First Cousin Relationship with George 
Burbidge, an Attorney Not Involved in This Matter, Does Not 
Justify Vacating the Award. 
Westgate argues that the Court can affirm the trial court's 
decision under one of two standards, the neutral arbitrator's failure to 
disclose a known, existing and substantial relationship, or any 
arbitrator's failure to disclose any fact, including existing or past 
relationships with a party, their counsel or representatives, a witness 
or another arbitrator, if a reasonable person would consider that fact 
likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator. 
Westgate is wrong on both counts. First, assuming arguendo 
that Arbitrator Burbidge, nominated by CPG, was a neutral arbitrator, 
the relationship between Arbitrator Burbidge and attorney Burbidge 
was not substantial and thus did not need to be disclosed. It is 
undisputed that the law firms of Arbitrator Burbidge and attorney 
Burbidge have been adverse to each other in litigation, and that 
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Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge have been adverse to each 
other in litigation. It is also uncontroverted that the Burbidges have 
no close familial relationship, have no active social relationship, have 
no business relationship with each other, have no personal 
connection to each other, do not speak with each other with any 
regularity, and have no financial relationship of any kind. (R. 5979-
5980; 5982; 6076). 
There is no applicable relevant standard in Utah law or 
anywhere which defines a first cousin relationship as de jure 
substantial. Westgate's attempt to make such an argument relies, 
not on the UPUAA or on the American Arbitration Association's Code 
of Ethics (the AAA Canons), but on training materials which list 
categories of relationships which could lead to vacatur. (Response 
Brief at 33-34). Westgate seeks to elevate an entry in a training list to 
binding status, something which the authors of the UPUAA and the 
AAA Canons did not do. Tellingly, Westgate cites to no court 
decision from any jurisdiction for support of its argument that a first 
cousin relationship is per se substantial and disqualifying. 
Absent any support for Westgate's position, the trial court's 
decision cannot be upheld. For a relationship to be 'substantial' there 
1R 
ought to be some substance to the relationship. When, as here, the 
relationship consists of first cousins with a 19 year age gap, virtually 
no personal interaction, no business or financial interaction of any 
kind, and less of a social relationship than many unrelated attorneys, 
it is not reasonable or rational to classify that relationship as 
substantial. Likewise, it is not reasonable or rational to expect a 
neutral arbitrator to even recognize the relationship as one which 
must be disclosed. 
Second, no reasonable person would consider the relationship 
between the Burbidges to be likely to affect the impartiality of the 
arbitrator. The Burbidges' relationship is marked by professional 
adversarial activities, and a complete lack of familial, social or 
financial association. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1) lists the type 
of facts which a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the 
impartiality of the arbitrator: "(a) a financial or personal interest in the 
outcome of the arbitration proceeding; and (b) an existing or past 
relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to arbitrate or the 
arbitration proceedings, their counsel or representative, a witness, or 
another arbitrator." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1). Although the 
list is not all inclusive, it is illustrative of the type of relationships which 
17 
might trigger the need to disclose. The Burbidge relationship is not 
similar to any of these factors. 
Westgate's argument that the first cousin relationship is an 
existing relationship ignores the reasonable person requirement of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1). The Utah Code does not require 
that all existing or past relationships must be disclosed, but only that 
those relationships must be disclosed if a reasonable person would 
consider those relationships to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator. 
Westgate does not address what standard is required by the 
reasonable person. 
Courts which have addressed the reasonable person standard 
generally describe it as an objective standard. For example, the 
Fourth Circuit has listed four factors relevant to a determination of 
whether a reasonable person would conclude that the impartiality of 
the arbitrator could be affected. Those factors are (1) the extent and 
character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of the 
arbitrator in the proceeding; (2) the directness of the relationship 
between the arbitrator and the party he or she is alleged to favor; (3) 
the connection of that relationship to the arbitration; and (4) the 
proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration 
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proceeding. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine 
Workers of America, 48 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 1995). Applying these 
standards to the Burbidge relationship leads to the conclusion that a 
reasonable person would not consider it likely to affect the impartiality 
of Arbitrator Burbidge. 
Similarly, Judge Posner, in the Seventh Circuit's decision of 
Merit Insurance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., found: "the test in 
this case is not whether the relationship was trivial; it is whether, 
having due regard for the different expectations regarding impartiality 
that parties bring to arbitration than to litigation, the relationship 
between Clifford and Stern was so intimate—personally, socially, 
professionally, or financially—as to cast serious doubt on Clifford's 
impartiality." Merit Insurance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 714 
F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983). 
In finding the district court erred in vacating the award, Judge 
Posner observed: "[t]o uphold the district court's vacation of the 
arbitration award in the absence of actual or probable partiality or 
corruption would open a new and, we fear, an interminable chapter in 
the efforts of people who have chosen arbitration and been 
disappointed in their choice to get the courts—to which they could 
19 
have turned in the first instance for resolution of their disputes—to 
undo the results of their preferred method of dispute resolution." Id. 
at 682. 
The specter of such forum shopping by disappointed parties, as 
noted by Judge Posner, is no red herring as Westgate conjectures. 
(Response Brief at 27, n.7). See Morelite Construction Corp. v. NY 
City District Council Carpenters Benefit Fund, 748 F.2d 79, 85 (2nd 
Cir. 1984); and Mahnke v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 565, 
579; 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 206 (2009). This case is also such an 
example. Westgate does not deny that it did not pursue the obvious 
similarity between the name of Arbitrator Burbidge and attorney 
Burbidge until after the decision of award was issued by the 
arbitration panel. 
That is why it is important for this Court to mandate that there 
be some substance to any relationship before a reasonable person 
can consider that relationship likely to affect the impartiality of an 
arbitrator. In this case, no reasonable person could conclude that the 
existing relationship, such as it is, between Arbitrator Burbidge and 
attorney George Burbidge, could be likely to affect the impartiality of 
the arbitrator. 
9n 
Moreover, attorney George Burbidge is neither a party to the 
arbitration proceeding nor counsel in the arbitration as contemplated 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1). Westgate makes the perplexing 
argument that attorney George Burbidge should be treated as a party 
because his firm, acting as CPG's counsel, could collect attorney fees 
in this matter. (Response Brief at 31). Of course, attorney Burbidge 
is not a party to this litigation. The term 'party' has a definite meaning 
which does not include the litigant's counsel, much less another 
attorney in the law firm representing the litigant. But even the terms 
were synonymous, attorney Burbidge and arbitrator Burbidge have no 
relationship which a reasonable person could consider likely to affect 
the arbitrator's impartiality.15 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should find that it has jurisdiction to hear this URAP 
Rule 5 appeal, and should reverse the vacatur decision of the trial 
court. 
15
 Although not addressed in the Brief of the Appellant, the issue of 
attorney Burbidge not being a party is properly addressed here since 
it was first raised by Westgate in its Response Brief. See URAP 
24(c) (Reply Brief may respond to new matter set forth in the 
opposing brief). 
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